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Modern Fibers, Inc. v. Puro16 held, in accordance with this
section, that the defendant has priority to the extent that he
may first examine the plaintiff with respect to all "material and
necessary" evidence. The plaintiff may then examine the defendant.
The court also noted that a defendant-by-counterclaim 57 should
be accorded priority with respect to examinations concerning "matters which are material and relevant solely by reason of the allegations of the counterclaims." 58 However, since, in the instant
case, certain defendants-by-counterclaim had not yet been served
with process, since certain of them were objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court, and since issue had not been completely joined on
the counterclaims, the court held that it would be improper to
provide for examinations by or of such defendants. The court's
decision with respect to the priority to be accorded the defendantsby-counterclaim seems to be a logical extension of 3106(a), since
the defendant in the original action becomes, in effect, the plaintiff
as to the counterclaims.
CPLR 3116(a): Amendment.
CPLR 3116(a) has been amended to require that any alteration which the witness wishes to make in a deposition be placed
"at the end of the deposition." This rule, as amended, makes it
clear that the original deposition is not to be altered no matter how
defective the witness might claim it to be. Prior to this amendment, corrections were often made by striking out the original and
inserting new language between the lines or at the foot of the
page in which the defective matter appeared. This procedure will
no longer be acceptable. Now, the most convenient way to
make the changes would be to footnote the point where a correction is desired and then at the end of the deposition to spell
out the correction keyed to the footnotes.
For a more detailed discussion of this amendment, see Professor
David D. Siegel's 1966 Cotmentary in McKinney's CPLR.
CPLR 3120: Awndment.
The rules of CPLR 3120
extended to apply to non-party
Before the amendment, a person
party witness had to resort to

concerning discovery have been
witnesses as well as to parties.
seeking discovery against a nona 3111 EBT of the non-party.

5626 App. Div. 2d 527, 271 N.Y.S2d 81 (1st Dep't 1966).

57 IJf B, the defendant in the original action, serves a counterclaim on
the plaintiff and on C and D and serves them with process they become
defendants-by-counterclaim.

68 Modern Fibers, Inc. v. Puro, 26 App. Div. 2d 527, 527-28, 271 N.Y.S.2d
81, 82 (1st Dep't 1966).
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Such a procedure required an undesired EBT with much wasted
time, effort and expense which resulted in a more restricted discovery than the one now given under CPLR 3120.
The amendment retains the content of the previous section
concerning the party but places this material under subdivision
(a). Subdivision (b) is completely new and permits discovery and
production of information from a non-party witness by referring
directly back to subdivision (a). However, there are important
differences between (a) and (b).
For a full discussion of this amendment, see Professor David
D. Siegel's 1966 Commentary in McKinney's CPLR.
CPLR 3126: Attorney fees not given as penalty for
failure to disclose.
Under CPLR 3126, if a party refuses to.comply with an
order for disclosure, or wilfully fails to disclose information which
a court finds should have been disclosed, the court may, inter alia,
strike out the defendant's pleadings until the order is obeyed, or
render a default judgment against the disobedient party. 9 In
order to provide for an alternative to the harsh sanctions contained
in CPLR 3126, the Judicial Conference in 1966 recommended the
addition of a new section to the CPLR. This section would
permit courts to require parties who make disclosure motions
necessary, i.e., parties who ignore a notice of disclosure, to pay costs
and expenses. This penalty would be imposed unless failure to
disclose was "unavoidable" or "justifiable." 60 This recommendation
was never acted upon by the legislature. However, case law has
provided its own alternatives to the provisions expressed in CPLR
3126. In Nomako v. Ashton,61 the court refrained from implementing the drastic penalties of CPLR 3126, but only upon the condition that the wrongdoer pay his adversary's full bill of costs,
including costs and disbursements on appeal and counsel fees.
In Nomako, the defendant failed to obey a court order for
disclosure. Since notice is also a method of obtaining disclosure,
the question arose whether CPLR 3126 was applicable to the
disregard of a disclosure notice.62 In Gaffney v. City of New
York,03 the court held that mere notice of disclosure is not enough.

59 CPLR 3126(3).

"o1966 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 90,
JuDicIAL ComRENcE 195.

6122 App. Div. 2d 683,
Warner v. Burngarner, 49
Monroe County 1966); Di
Misc. 2d 843, 265 N.Y.S2d
62 See 7B McKNmsY's
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253 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1st Dep't 1964). See also
Misc. 2d 488, 267 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct.
Bartolo v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 48
981 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1966).
CPLR 3126, supp. commentary 160-69 (1965).

1 41 Misc. 2d 1049, 247 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964).

